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“Spies All Their Lives”:
African Americans and Military 
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly S. Mayer
In December 1863, an Irish-born Confederate officer of  
the Army of  Tennessee concluded that only one measure could 
possibly save the slaveholders’ republic. Major-General Patrick 
Cleburne, panicking about the sequence of  devastating defeats 
suffered by his army, proposed that the Confederacy arm and 
emancipate its slaves. Such an assertion from a southern senior 
military officer was astonishing, to say the least. The Confederacy 
went to war to preserve the institution of  slavery and to defend its 
right to exist as the only independent slaveholding republic.1 Yet, 
Cleburne’s memorandum starkly revealed the reality of  the war—
that slavery was no longer the “great…truth” that Confederate 
Vice President Alexander Stephens had claimed it to be in March 
1861.2 Over the course of  the struggle, Cleburne insisted, the 
institution of  slavery had become one of  the Confederacy’s 
“chief  sources of  weakness.”3 Although Cleburne’s proposal 
was never adopted, his core contention highlighted the immense 
threat enslaved African Americans posed to the embattled 
Confederacy.
 In the address to his fellow officers, Major-General 
Cleburne recounted the humiliating circumstances of  the 
Confederacy during the war. “Every soldier in our army already 
knows and feels our numerical inferiority to the enemy,” he 
affirmed, and, “if  this state continues much longer we must 
be subjugated.” Moreover, Cleburne identified “the three 
great causes operating to destroy us,” specifically, numerical 
inferiority of  southern troops, inadequate supplies, and, most 
shockingly, the increasing military cost of  slavery.4 He explained 
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that slaves worked actively against the Confederacy, serving as 
an “omnipresent spy system” and deterring Southerners from 
fighting Union troops because they had to ensure that their slaves 
were “not free to move and strike like the enemy.”5 Because of  
slavery, Cleburne affirmed, the South was forced to wage war 
“with the Union army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear.’”6 
Slaves had become, in every sense, “the enemy within.”7 
Even prior to Cleburne’s realization of  slaves’ 
contributions to Union military intelligence, southern planters 
and military officials recognized the immense problem of  slave 
allegiance. Planters routinely complained about their slaves’ 
insubordination, unsure of  how to control the restive population. 
These planters feared that slaves were endlessly assisting Union 
officials throughout the South, posing an acute threat to the 
Confederacy that was seemingly impossible to halt. From the 
civilian viewpoint, slaves, who were “absen[t] of  the political ties 
of  allegiance,” were utterly undermining the Confederacy; they 
had indeed become the Confederacy’s “most vulnerable point.”8 
The reality was undeniable—enslaved, escaped, and 
freed African Americans greatly assisted the Union war effort. 
This thesis aims to uncover the military and naval intelligence 
contributions of  African American men and women during 
the American Civil War (1861-1865). In particular, it focuses 
on why and how African Americans participated in clandestine 
activities—what made them excellent scouts and guides, how 
they contributed in Union campaigns, and the means they used 
to undermine the Confederacy on its plantations and in its 
households. 
The independent slaveholding republic fell victim not 
just to Union forces but also, significantly, to the determined 
resistance of  its enslaved population. The Confederacy’s fleeting 
existence demonstrates that, in so many ways, human chattel 
made history: they cemented the destruction of  the Confederacy 
and the institution of  slavery. War transformed enslaved men 
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and women into the “enemy within” that the Confederate South 
was simply unable to suppress. 
In May 1861, Union Major General Benjamin Butler 
occupied Fortress Monroe, Virginia, which served as an 
important staging ground for naval operations and intelligence-
gathering activities along the coastlines of  the Carolinas. Beyond 
its strategic significance, Fortress Monroe served as the grounds 
where Butler and the region’s slaves forged the first alliance 
between the Union Army and the South’s enslaved population. 
Butler recognized that fugitive slaves possessed exceptionally 
valuable information regarding Confederate activities and a 
superior understanding of  local southern terrain.9 Accordingly, 
he deployed fugitives’ talents against the Confederacy.10 When 
Butler was transferred from Fortress Monroe to the Department 
of  the Gulf  in early 1862 to lead “the land forces destined to 
cooperate with the Navy in the attack upon New Orleans [in 
Louisiana],” he knew that slave military intelligence would again 
play a critical role.11 Thus, Butler recruited Abraham Galloway, a 
fugitive slave and northern spy, to assist in the perilous campaign. 
This was far from Galloway’s first Union intelligence 
task. In April 1861, by the recommendation of  abolitionist 
George Stearns, Massachusetts’s war leaders recruited Galloway 
to serve as a spy in the Confederacy.12 Galloway did not stumble 
upon the Union camp in his attempt to escape the South nor did 
he beg for admittance into the camp as a safe haven; rather, in 
all certainty, he was sought after to participate in the northern 
intelligence network.13 Galloway routinely aided in Union military 
operations, traveling extensively behind enemy lines and risking 
his life infiltrating unfamiliar southern plantations. 
The logic behind Galloway’s recruitment was seemingly 
incontrovertible. Who better to stealthily blend into Confederate 
society than a black man born and raised in the South? Who 
more adept to penetrate the Confederacy than an ex-slave 
who previously escaped to the North? And yet, Galloway’s 
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recruitment to the Union intelligence network marked one of  
the first instances that Union military leaders recognized the 
potential of  slaves to undermine the Confederate war effort.14 
At the start of  the American Civil War, President 
Abraham Lincoln and the federal government were politically 
committed to defeating the South, irrespective of  slavery.15 In 
his proclamation on April 15, 1861, President Lincoln promised 
“to avoid any destruction of, or interference with, property,” 
namely slavery.16 “Certain it is that the Republicans…are ‘no 
friends of  slavery,’” Treasury Secretary Samuel Chase assured a 
prominent Kentuckian, “but it is just as certain that they have 
never proposed to interfere…with slavery in any State.”17 Thus, 
the fluid relationship between Galloway and Butler would not 
have been feasible in most Union commands.18 That spring, the 
prevailing military opinion was that a northern victory should 
pose no threat to the rights of  southern slaveholders to hold 
African Americans in bondage. A few days after Butler occupied 
Fortress Monroe, for instance, Major General George B. 
McClellan, later commanding field general, reassured Virginia’s 
Unionists that he would not confiscate their slaves. Indeed, 
McClellan promised to fight “for my country and the Union, not 
for abolition…” and to “crush any attempt at insurrection.”19 
Abiding by this sentiment, Union forces routinely vowed that 
they would not interfere with southern property, most essentially 
slavery, upon attacking the South.20 
Accordingly, when Major General Butler encountered 
slaves entering Fortress Monroe, he specifically labeled them 
“contraband of  war” to obliterate any obligation to return them 
to slaveholders who claimed them as property.21 If  his troops 
had acquired a Confederate wagon or mule, would they have 
contacted their rightful owners to return them? In reality, the 
Union troops simply would have put the acquired resources 
to good use. Thus, while Butler’s use of  the term “contraband 
of  war” was loose, his argument made logical sense. When he 
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justified his decision to the Union War Department, President 
Lincoln deemed it unobjectionable. In early August 1861, the 
United States Congress formulated the general principle into 
The First Confiscation Act, which ordered the forfeiture of  any 
slaves utilized in direct assistance to the Confederate war effort.22 
This resolve was directly tested at the end of  August 1861, when 
Major General John C. Frémont, Commander of  the Western 
Department, exercised stern measures to suppress guerrilla 
activity.23 On August 30th, he declared martial law throughout 
Missouri, mandating, “the court-martial and execution of  all 
persons taken with arms in their hands within Union lines.”24 As 
a way to punish those who abetted southern partisans, Frémont 
ordered the property of  active dissenters confiscated and their 
slaves declared free, asserting that the proclamation was of  
military necessity. President Lincoln contested the order, stating 
that the permanent future condition of  slavery “must be settled 
according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military 
proclamations.”25 Frémont was thereby instructed to rescind 
the emancipation provision. Accordingly, Butler’s “contraband” 
order and Frémont’s unsuccessful proclamation determined the 
limits of  acceptable military interference with slavery during the 
first years of  the American Civil War.26 
Growing recognition of  fugitive slaves’ military value, 
specifically of  their local knowledge and their experience to 
spy, scout, or guide Union troops, slowly eroded the policy 
of  exclusion. Yankee Colonel Simon H. Mix of  the 2nd New 
York Cavalry attested to their importance in assisting military 
expeditions into Confederate territory. “In all our expeditions in 
North Carolina we have depended upon the negroes as guides,” 
Mix claimed, “for without them we could not have moved with 
any safety.” He was particularly grateful for slaves’ guidance in 
the Low Country, as “nowhere in the swamps of  North Carolina 
can you find a path where a dog can go that the negro does 
not understand.”27 “Upwards of  fifty volunteers of  the best and 
Penn History Review     16 
Spies All Their Lives
most courageous,” reported Vincent Colyer, superintendent 
of  the poor in New Bern, North Carolina in 1862, “were kept 
constantly employed on the perilous but important duty of  
spies, scouts, and guides.”28 In these tasks, Colyer recounted, 
slaves barely escaped with their lives, as they were pursued on 
several occasions by bloodhounds and taken as prisoners.29 He 
affirmed that African American operatives were “invaluable and 
almost indispensible [sic]” and “frequently went from thirty to 
three hundred miles within the enemy’s lines” to “bring back 
important and reliable information.”30 Such accounts confirmed 
that many Union leaders had begun to recognize the advantages 
and the value of  slaves’ intelligence. 
In March 1862, Congress instituted The Act Prohibiting 
the Return of  Slaves, which barred Union soldiers from returning 
fugitive slaves to their owners. The new article undermined the 
Fugitive Slave Act of  1850—which legally required all runaway 
slaves to be returned to their masters—and marked a turning 
point in federal policy.31 In April 1862, Major General Abner 
Doubleday’s instructions to Colonel J.D. Shaul, Commander 
of  the 46th New York Infantry, cited the new article of  war in 
requiring his troops to treat fugitive slaves “as persons and not 
as chattels.” “Under no circumstances has the commander of  
a Fort or camp the power of  surrendering persons claimed as 
fugitive slaves as this cannot be done without determining their 
character,” Doubleday affirmed. When asked by the commander 
if  it would be better to exclude fugitive slaves altogether from 
Union lines, Doubleday responded, “…they bring much valuable 
information which cannot be obtained from any other source. 
They are acquainted with all the roads, path fords and other natural 
features of  the country and they make excellent guides. They 
also know and frequently have exposed the haunts of  secession 
spies and traitors and the existence of  rebel organization. They 
will not therefore be excluded.”32 
A July 1862 article in the Chicago Tribune cemented this 
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opinion, advocating for an “immediate alliance with the slaves 
of  rebels” as they were the most versatile guides, a sort of  “live 
map.”33 The article continued:
Oh, how must the Genius of  rebellion have 
grinned, from her outlook, at the misguided 
wandering in an unmapped wilderness of  
an army of  invasion! Maps! Useless works 
of  the engineering art, when negroes, live 
maps, that could see, and walk, and talk, 
and point with the index finger—crowds 
of  them—stood expectant within reach of  
our army, and hungered and thirsted to be 
employed to conduct us to the enemy by 
the driest and best paths—maps capable of  
leading us, with unerring certainty, through 
the woods to the lowest and weakest parts 
of  the line of  entrenchments the rebels had 
thrown up…aged maps, sold from plantation 
to plantation, through the Peninsula, and 
familiar from ancient coon-hunting, and still 
persistent night wandering, with every road 
and swamp in it…would have led our army 
right up to the places of  weakness…I knew 
108,000 men in April last who, under such 
guidance and such God-speed, would have 
stormed the gates of  hell.34
The Chicago Tribune reporter, like Doubleday, promoted the 
Union’s collaboration with slaves in gaining military intelligence. 
Many Union military officials, however, resisted utilizing 
slaves in their military campaigns. “Not all Union officers 
welcome blacks into their lines,” explained Captain C.B. Wilder, 
Superintendent of  Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, as “many 
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were suspicious of  the abandoned and self-liberated slaves.” 
These officers “lacked a forthright commitment to emancipation” 
and “placed a higher value upon potentially loyal slaveholders 
than upon demonstrably loyal slaves.”35 Specifically, Major 
General Don Carlos Buell, Commander of  the Army of  Ohio in 
Kentucky, sought to exclude all slaves from Union lines despite 
the fact that slaves provided “in every case the most reliable 
as well as important information of  the rebel movements” to 
officers in Kentucky and Tennessee. In April 1862, the Chicago 
Tribune reported that Major General Buell received “the means of  
detecting officers and spies lurking in Nashville [in Tennessee],” 
critical information that enabled him “to nip a conspiracy in the 
bud and prevent an insurrectionary movement.” Nonetheless, 
Buell denied the intelligence of  slaves, “…a people who are 
naturally enemies to those who hold them in bondage.”36  
Yet, other Union military officials quickly learned the 
value of  African Americans’ willingness to provide intelligence 
and became staunch opponents of  proslavery military policies. 
Initially, like most Union generals at this pre-emancipation stage 
of  the war, Major General Ormsby M. Mitchel, commander 
of  a division of  the Army of  Ohio, did not encourage slave 
rebellion. He scrupulously conformed to Buell’s orders regarding 
fugitive slaves. However, Mitchel’s subordinates denounced 
such obedience. One commander of  an Ohio regiment offered 
his resignation in protest against Mitchel’s order–issued at the 
express direction of  Buell–to expel fugitive slaves from the 
camps of  their division. Characterizing the order as “repugnant 
to my feelings as a man,” the officer threatened to abandon his 
service if  forced to obey it. Although only a few other officers 
and enlisted men took such a principled stance, several faulted 
Mitchel for “inconsistency in regard to the eternal negro 
question.”37 Their resentment toward Buell’s solicitude for the 
rights of  slaveholders, and of  Mitchel’s subservience to Buell, 
was made blatantly apparent.38 
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Military circumstances prompted Mitchel to dissociate 
himself  from Buell’s policy though. In late March and early April 
1862, as the majority of  Buell’s army moved southwest from 
Nashville to join the other western armies at Pittsburg Landing, 
Tennessee, Mitchel’s division marched south toward Huntsville, 
Alabama, in the heart of  the Tennessee Valley plantation district. 
Deep in enemy territory and attempting to guard several hundred 
miles of  railroad and river, Mitchel depended on slaves for 
information about Confederate concentrations and movements. 
“With the assistance of  the Negroes in watching the River,” 
Mitchel expressed, “I feel myself  sufficiently strong to defy the 
enemy.” He later revealed that African Americans were “our 
only friends” and that “in two instances I owe my own safety 
to their faithfulness.”39 In gratitude, Mitchel promised military 
protection to his slave allies, “who have given me valuable 
assistance and information.” In May 1862, he wrote to Secretary 
of  War Edward M. Stanton requesting the “protection of  my 
government” for “slaves who furnish us valuable information.” 
Like his subordinate, Mitchel affirmed that if  his request 
were disapproved, “it would be impossible for me to hold my 
position.”40 Stanton endorsed the appeal. “The assistance of  
slaves is an element of  military strength which under proper 
regulations you are fully justified in employing for your security 
and the success of  your operations,” Stanton replied, and to 
abstain from its use “would be a failure to employ means to 
suppress the Rebellion.”41 
Mitchel corresponded with Stanton one month later 
in defense of  the slaves who assisted him. After reading a 
republished letter in The Philadelphia Inquirer that caused him “to 
fear that the Commanding General of  the Army has returned 
to their masters, Slaves, to whom I promised the permanent 
protection of  the Government of  the United States,” Mitchel 
wrote to Stanton attesting that these slaves “had rendered 
valuable services, and had obtained for me most important 
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information.” He begged for Stanton’s intervention on behalf  
of  these slaves, for “if  they fall into the hands of  their masters, 
their lives will not be safe.”42 Assistant Secretary of  War Peter H. 
Watson responded to Mitchel’s panicked letter, avowing that the 
newspaper’s statement had “no significant authority to sustain it” 
and thus Mitchel’s promise to the slaves was upheld.43 
At this pre-emancipation stage of  the war, Mitchel’s 
appreciation of  slaves’ assistance to Union troops fighting in 
the South was quite progressive. Even after January 1, 1863, 
Union military officers baselessly differentiated between fugitive 
slaves and outlined in a complex array the circumstances under 
which they should and should not be welcome in Union camps.44 
For example, Brigadier General Henry Hayes Lockwood, a 
commander of  volunteers in the lower Potomac, affirmed that 
“military camps shall not be used as places of  public resort or for 
idlers” and all should be denied admittance except those providing 
information. “Information will be sought for from all sources 
and rewards in money,” Lockwood declared, “with protection 
from danger from giving information may be promised to all, 
White and Black.”45 There was, seemingly, a difference drawn 
between accepting slaves as fugitives and accepting the integral 
intelligence that they brought with them. 
The value of  military intelligence held by enslaved, 
escaped, and freed African Americans became undeniably 
apparent. “It is utterly impossible for us to subdue the rebels, 
without an alliance with their slaves,” the Chicago Tribune detailed 
in July 1862, as “we have everywhere been helpless without 
these blacks, or exposed to hap-hazard.” The report recounted 
numerous Union military blunders and claimed that “this 
alliance with the slaves would have saved the precious, time-
wasting preparations.”46 Moreover, Union Colonel of  the 1st 
South Carolina Volunteers Thomas W. Higginson astutely noted 
that slaves “have been spies all their lives.” “You cannot teach 
them anything” with respect to clandestine activity, Higginson 
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revealed, and “I should not attempt to give them instructions…
they would better be able to teach me.” Higginson realized that 
slaves had practiced dissemblance and stealth throughout their 
lives. Nearly from birth, they learned “to travel furtively at night, 
to communicate surreptitiously, and to defend themselves”; they 
already mastered the arts of  masquerade, disguise, and forgery.47
Abraham Galloway was chief  among them. At the 
commencement of  the war, he traveled to the Confederacy seeking 
“to go South to incite insurrections.”48 Galloway joined Butler’s 
command at Fortress Monroe in May 1861 and “possess[ed] 
the fullest confidence of  the commanding General.”49 In the 
following two and a half  years, Galloway deployed his covert 
intelligence against the Confederacy from the Chesapeake Bay to 
the Mississippi River, risking his life skirting slave patrols, enemy 
scouts, and Confederate army units. Reporting directly to one 
of  the Union Army’s highest ranking field officers, Galloway 
seemingly played a significant role in Union intelligence in 
Virginia. In a letter to a colleague in the fall of  1863, Brigadier 
General Edward A. Wild, a colonel in the Army of  the Potomac, 
succinctly noted Galloway’s service as a spy: “I would like to do 
all I can for Galloway, who has served his country well.”50 
Former slaves such as Galloway were uniquely suited to 
operate behind enemy lines: they were familiar with southern 
life, able to fade unobtrusively into local slave communities, and 
conditioned to living by guile and by stealth. African Americans 
utilized their local knowledge and their experience to guide Union 
troops through the southern terrain. Accustomed to traveling 
furtively between southern plantations, they “were as thoroughly 
acclimated as the black snakes and alligators that bask in these 
Southern waters.”51 Additionally, African Americans’ knowledge 
of  the physical geography was especially helpful to Union 
soldiers. When two Northerners escaped from a Confederate 
prison camp in Columbia, South Carolina, they chanced upon a 
large plantation in Pickens District. The plantation’s slaves readily 
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“provided information about the local terrain, the movement of  
Confederate troops, the location of  practical supplies, and the 
presence of  rebels and political sympathizers alike.” They also 
advised the soldiers “to stop at the home of  John W. Wilson, 
a strong Union man.”52 Virtually everywhere Union soldiers 
traveled, they encountered slaves such as these ready to provide 
geographical information about the local terrain, the movement 
of  Confederate troops, the location of  pickets and armaments, 
and the presence of  rebels and political sympathizers alike. 
Additionally, slaves crafted maps of  the South, consisting 
of  paths unknown to their masters. Such cartographic diagrams—
shared amongst slaves and with Union troops—illustrated “the 
shortcuts and winding paths that crisscrossed the land and 
plantation boundaries and led out into the woods, along which 
people and goods moved clandestinely.”53 When W.L. Curry of  
the 1st Ohio Cavalry was cut off  from his command south of  the 
Tennessee River and was seeking safety, he met “a colored man 
going to mill with a sack of  corn on his back” who revealed that 
he was only ten miles away from his destination. “He directed me 
the way I should go,” Curry recalled, “and cautioned me to keep 
away from public roads, as the country was full of  rebel cavalry 
and I was liable to be picked up at any moment.”54 
Similarly, James Pike, a Texas-born white Union spy, 
received vital assistance from slaves he encountered while 
struggling to find his way back to his command in northern 
Alabama in the late summer of  1862. Having spent the night 
soaking wet after falling into a swamp, Pike chanced upon a 
plantation, where he befriended the working slaves and sought 
out their assistance. One young slave guided Pike away toward 
Huntsville, Alabama. Pike recounted, “My guide seemed to be 
perfectly at home in the swamp, and piloted the way for three 
miles over a string of  logs, which seemed to be arranged by 
accident, and not design, so as to form a complete chain across 
it, so that we were landed on the opposite side without wading a 
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step.”55 Curry and Pike, astounded at the secret pathways that were 
revealed to them, were lucky beneficiaries of  slaves’ surreptitious 
travel methods.56 Such instances affirmed that “contrabands” 
provided “some of  the most valuable information” regarding 
the “position, movements, and plans of  the enemy, use of  
topography of  the country.”57 
African Americans’ greatest concealment was, naturally, 
their skin color, which allowed them to observe, eavesdrop, 
and carry back information to Union lines without suspicion. 
“Slave cover” rendered African Americans “so ubiquitous” in 
a southern household “that neither the table, the parlor, nor 
the sleeping room has any secrets from them.” They “catch up 
on everything that is said,” a Chicago Tribune reporter attested in 
August 1861, and “their opportunities for getting information 
are vastly better than those of  the poorer class of  whites…”58 
William Robinson, a driver and house servant on a North Carolina 
plantation, was “the kind of  slave whose mobility and access 
to white conversations provided him with valuable information 
and the means to relay it.”59 Although he was illiterate, he 
nonetheless outfoxed slaveholders by learning how to “listen 
carefully to every conversation held between white people.”60 
According to the Chicago Tribune, slaves such as Robinson “hung 
about groups of  whites,” their “countenances unutterably stolid, 
or grinning with stupid indifference,” as if  they neither heard 
nor understood, yet actually retained and transmitted everything 
said.61 In his autobiography, late nineteenth century black activist 
Booker T. Washington recounted that slaves “got knowledge of  
the results of  great battles before the white people,” owing to 
the clever machinations of  the bondman assigned to pick up the 
mail. “The man who was sent to the office would linger about 
the place long enough to get the drift of  the conversation from 
the group of  white people,” Washington revealed, and “the mail-
carrier on his way back to our master’s house would as naturally 
retail the news that he had secured among the slaves.”62 In these 
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ways, slaves were constantly a step or two ahead of  their masters.
Union military officials such as Lieutenant Colonel 
Josiah Given, a commander of  an Ohio regiment, benefited 
from such covert activities. While stationed in Tennessee in 
December 1862, Given received information from a slave named 
Johnston, who arrived at his pickets and informed him “that he 
overheard [a party of  the southern cavalry] tell his master that 
they were going to a certain point on the road from Shelbyville 
to Fayetteville that night and would attack and capture a supply 
train that was to pass there in the morning.” Acting upon this 
information, Given sent two infantry companies, accompanied 
by Johnston who served as a guide, to surround and to capture 
the enemy. “They reported to me to have found everything just 
as [Johnston] represented,” Given attested.”63 Simply by working 
as human chattel within southern homes, slaves were capable of  
utterly undercutting those who were fighting a war to keep them 
in bondage.  
“Slave cover” proved so effective for Union intelligence 
that Sarah Emma Edmonds, a white northern woman, disguised 
herself  as an African American male to infiltrate the Confederacy, 
crossing gender and racial lines. Edmonds “dyed her skin with 
silver nitrate, donned a minstrel wig, and posed in a double 
disguise as a man and an African American.”64 Playing the role 
of  a man named “Cuff,” she worked in Confederate kitchens 
and ramparts, and collected information on troop figures, 
fortifications, and morale. “Of  one thing I am sure,” the Chicago 
Tribune reported, “that the negroes, whose cunning and duplicity 
are wonderful, have a pretty fair idea of  what is going on, and 
only await the word to work fearful mischief.”65 
Beyond their own aptitude for clandestine activities, 
African Americans advantageously exploited the ways in which 
white men perceived black men and defined the American Civil 
War. At the war’s onset, the majority of  white men, northern 
and southern, did not seriously consider African Americans 
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part of  the war effort.66 Historian Stephanie McCurry explains 
that whites on both sides of  the war viewed the conflict as the 
“Brothers’ War,” meaning white man against white man, not one 
in which slaves were included to participate. It was “the brothers 
who brought it on in their (divided) capacity as the people,” she 
explains, “and the brothers assumed it would be theirs to fight.”67 
Despite being excluded from political life (i.e. citizenry), slaves 
were counted, as labor, in the southern war effort; Confederate 
white men believed firmly that slaves were one of  the 
Confederacy’s “most potent elements of  strength.”68 McCurry 
reveals that Confederates assumed adamantly that “the southern 
negro ha[d] no sympathies with Northern abolitionists.”69 African 
Americans could not seek out more than that kind of  oblivion, 
which allowed for their penetration of  Confederate lands. Thus, 
African Americans were capable of  taking advantage of  the 
southern collective mindset that could not envision them as 
agents actively undermining the Confederate war effort. 
In fact, southern slaveholders entered the war confident 
in their slaves’ devotion to the Confederacy. No master pondered 
if  his slaves would participate in the war, McCurry notes, as “racial 
ideology provided all of  the proof  needed of  slaves’ willingness 
to serve the masters’ cause.”70 In his March 1861 “Cornerstone 
Speech,” Confederate Vice President Stephens explained that 
the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, 
upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white 
man; that slavery is his natural and moral condition.”71 Thus, the 
Houston Telegraph declared, “if  slavery is what we believe it to 
be—the best form of  society—it is not only fitted for peace but 
for the exigencies of  war.”72 Human bondage was not considered 
a “necessary evil”—it was deemed a legitimate advantage to the 
southern war effort. 
Such racial ideology solidified slaveholders’ risky 
undertaking. “One salutary result of  the movement in favor of  
Southern independence has been the awakening of  Northern 
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minds to the true relations existing between the negro and the 
white man,” wrote a Louisiana editor in March 1861. “The idea 
of  the equality of  race is a figment,” he maintained, as “the 
negro is happiest” when in servitude.73 Accordingly, Chief  of  
the Confederate Bureau of  War Albert T. Bledsoe affirmed 
“that almost every slave would cheerfully aid his master in the 
work of  hurling back the fanatical invader.”74 “They would as 
soon suspect their children of  conspiring against their lives,” a 
correspondent of  the Charleston Mercury stated, affirming that 
planters had absolutely nothing to fear regarding their slaves 
in wartime.75 In fact, “many masters…have actually called their 
slaves together and given them long pretended ‘explanations’ 
of  the pending troubles,” the Chicago Tribune reported in August 
1861, “and told them bug bear stones of  what the Abolitionists 
in ‘Old Abe’s’ army would do to them if  they ever got them 
in their clutches.”76 Thus, enslaved men and women were to be 
entirely disposed depending upon their masters’ consent.77 Early 
thoughts of  slavery as an element of  strength in the war rested 
upon the baseless assumption that slaves would simply join the 
southern effort. 
As secessionists boasted about the advantages of  
slavery to a republic at war, their slaves sought to undermine 
directly that very notion. Nearly everywhere behind Confederate 
lines, slaves attempted to be informed of  military and political 
developments, which, in a variety of  ways, eroded the customary 
masterly authority. According to Booker T. Washington, slaves 
in the hills of  western Virginia “watched…every success of  the 
Federal armies and every defeat of  the Confederate forces…with 
the keenest and most intense interest.”78 Indeed, a former slave 
who lived in a remote section of  east-central Texas divulged, 
“during them times just like today nearly everybody knows what 
going on” and that slaves helped “news travel pretty fast.”79 
Major General Butler’s experience outwitting local 
planters in New Orleans demonstrated slaves’ intimate knowledge 
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of  southern activities. Following his successful amphibious 
assault on Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina in August 1861, 
Butler traveled to New Orleans and took command of  the city. 
While attempting to bring order to the city, he implemented 
“speedy and condign punishment” of  southern offenders, which 
fostered a prevailing belief  “that nothing could be done there 
that [he] could not find out.” It was supposed that Butler had 
“the best spy system in the world.” That was quite true, yet not 
in the way Confederates imagined. In early June 1862, Butler was 
informed of  a series of  “sewing bees” taking place in the house 
of  a Confederate woman, where secessionist women gathered to 
craft a flag to send to a Confederate New Orleans regiment. When 
he confronted the ringleader, she instinctively denied his charges. 
“General, you must be mistaken; you have been misinformed 
as to the person,” she claimed. Butler retorted, “Madam, if  I 
were you I wouldn’t deny that which you know and I know. You 
have had that flag made; it is finished and in your house; and I 
should get it from there now, as I have seen fit to move about 
it, if  I had to take down your house from roof  to hearth-stone.” 
After revealing the flag, she asked Butler, “which of  those girls 
gave information about this flag?” as she was certain that “it was 
not one of  my servants.” “‘I have no objection to you secession 
women eating each other like Kilkenny cats,” Butler replied, “but 
you may accuse her unjustly. It may be your servants, which I 
suppose you have.” She adamantly retorted, “No, it was not my 
servants, General; that won’t do.” Butler later revealed in his 
private writings that, in truth, “the negroes all came and told me 
anything they thought I wanted to know.”80
A similar instance of  surreptitious slaves emasculating 
their ‘patriarchs’ was recorded in the diary of  Julia LeGrand, the 
daughter of  a successful Louisiana planter and a New Orleans 
resident.81 James Woodson, a slave of  Jack Toney in Fluvanna 
County, Virginia, escaped from his cruel master and reached 
Union troops under the command of  General Philip Sheridan, 
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then raiding Virginia. The fugitive directed Union soldiers to 
the home of  his former employer and had his master tied up 
and whipped as Woodson’s master had done to the former 
slave countless times. Woodson then guided the Union soldiers 
to abundant stores of  armaments, which they took away or 
destroyed on the spot.82 Such activities aggravated Southerners 
and prompted them to further punish their slaves. Likewise, 
the slaves on John Williams’s plantation in Helena, Arkansas, 
exposed their master’s small supply of  arms and ammunition. 
Lieutenant M.H. David recalled, “When upon investigating his 
‘negroes’, I ascertained that Williams had in his possession [guns 
and rifles], which he had just denied saying he was an honest 
man and did not have any use for arms, or ammunition…
consequently I had his house minutely searched…” David found 
many guns, some of  which were even hidden within his wife’s 
belongings. Similar to Butler’s confession, David admitted, “The 
‘negroes’ told me that [Williams] had [the arms and ammunition] 
the night before…”83 Ultimately, masters least appreciated 
being undermined. A Louisiana editor and slaveholder, John H. 
Ramsdell characterized this best when he described his slaves 
as “ungrateful and vindictive scoundrels who took possession 
of  their master’s property, pointed his place of  refuge out to 
the enemy, or voluntarily acted as guides to them in their 
marauding overspreading of  our country.”84 Yet, slaveholders 
were helpless—the slaves were the enemy within. 
The continuation of  extensive black communication 
networks formed during the antebellum period allowed 
intelligence to travel over long distances, which further revealed 
the limits of  slaves’ supposed allegiance.85 “Somehow or other, by 
some secret telegraph which cannot be detected, whatever one 
learns is speedily communicated to the rest,” the Chicago Tribune 
reported in August 1861.86 John Azor Kellogg, Colonel of  the 
6th Wisconsin Infantry Volunteer Regiment, found the slave 
“telegraph line” in Georgia’s northeastern highlands particularly 
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useful in reporting on military activity within the region. Kellogg 
was so impressed with the information slaves provided that 
he characterized slaves “as a class, better informed of  passing 
events and had a better idea of  questions involved in the struggle 
between North and South, than the majority of  that class known 
as the ‘poor white’ of  the South.”87 
George Washington Albright, born a slave but who 
would later serve in the Mississippi State Senate as a free man 
in the 1870s, revealed a far better coordinated network of  
communication in Marshall County.88 “That was my first job in 
the fight for the rights of  my people,” he recalled, “to keep [slaves] 
informed and in readiness to assist the Union armies whenever 
the opportunity came.” Fifteen years old at the time, Albright 
had been “a runner for what we called the 4-Ls—Lincoln’s Legal 
Loyal League” and consequently, “traveled about the plantations 
within a certain range and got together small meetings in the 
cabins.”89 The South Carolina planter and politician James Henry 
Hammond was certain that he could see the disconcerting results 
of  such communication networks “on all the negro faces” on 
his plantation, Redcliffe, in late June 1863. Hammond took little 
comfort in the “peculiar furtive glance with which they regard me 
and a hanging off  from me that I do not like.”90 Such complaints 
resounded in the diaries and letters of  numerous slaveholders 
remaining at home or refuged at other sites, and testified to what 
could be considered a “second front” opened by slaves within 
the Confederacy.91  
Masters’ knowledge of  the lengths to which their slaves 
went to assist the enemy obliterated their fictions of  passivity and 
loyalty. “It eventually registered at every level of  the Confederate 
regime, from the plantation to the high officials of  central state 
authority,” McCurry affirms, and spawned a series of  significant 
adjustments in the southern conduct of  war. In August 1862, 
slaves from Beaufort, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia 
arrived at Union lines carrying valuable information threatening 
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the safety of  local Confederate troops. Accordingly, southern 
officers instructed to “make a reconnaissance up the country 
around Summerville, South Carolina” due to the “disturbance 
and alarm…caused by gangs of  runaway negroes, leagued 
with deserters in that neighborhood.”92 A few months later, 
Confederate Colonel Lawrence Keitt confirmed the persistent 
need for troops in coastal South Carolina to guard all of  the 
inlets along the coast. McCurry notes, “It was knowledge of  
those kinds of  inland waterways and the number and precise 
position of  Confederate troops, pickets, fortifications, and guns” 
that slaves “conveyed in astonishing detail to federal forces in 
Beaufort.”93 Thus, Keitt assigned more men, whom he could 
not afford to relinquish from his own operations, to join the 
“three cavalry companies…and two infantry companies” already 
assigned to guard and patrol the coast.94 Keitt’s understanding 
of  vulnerable points of  exit and entry along the coast of  South 
Carolina demonstrated the challenges slaveholders faced in 
trying to keep the enemy out when there was another enemy to 
guide them in.95 
Similarly, in November 1862, a Confederate Major 
Jeffords ordered the removal of  the slaves of  Mr. Warren, an 
Ashepoo River planter, on “incontestable proof ” that they were 
“in continual intercourse with the enemy” and thus endangered 
his picket line. Jeffords’ commanding officer confirmed the truth 
of  the charges against local slaves. When he sent a scout “who 
pretended to be a Yankee” to test “one or two negroes near the 
enemy’s lines,” they provided him with “all the information an 
enemy could desire in regard to position and strength of  my 
pickets.”96 Union naval men operating on the South Carolina 
rivers relied on this type of  intelligence to strategize and 
plan their operations. “It is a matter of  notoriety,” lamented 
Confederate States District Attorney P.H. Aylett, “in sections of  
the Confederacy where raids are frequent that the guides of  the 
enemy are nearly always free negroes and slaves.”97 
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In an attempt to maintain southern order and prevent 
slaves from assisting the Union, the Confederacy created 
the “Twenty Negro Law” in October 1862, which provided 
exemptions from military service to those who owned twenty 
or more slaves.98 Among planters and state officials, the “Twenty 
Nigger Law,” as white southerners called it, generated demands 
to protect plantations and curtail escape to the enemy. In late 
1863, near the town of  Charlotte, North Carolina, a planter 
requested a military exemption for his brother so that “order and 
discipline” might be better maintained “in the neighborhood.”99 
Women, who remained on plantations as their husbands served 
in battle, also voiced their fears publicly, writing hundreds of  
letters to state and Confederate officials imploring that men be 
released from military service to control slaves. “I fear the blacks 
more than I do the Yankees,” confessed Mrs. A. Ingraham of  
Vicksburg, Mississippi. In Virginia, one woman observed that 
living with slavery in wartime was like living “with enemies in 
our own households.”100 The imperatives of  controlling a restive 
slave population strained relations within the Confederacy 
and confirmed that slaves were, in fact, the Confederacy’s 
“open enemies” who were “well calculated to do [the South] 
immense injury.”101 The “Twenty Negro Law” was only the most 
conspicuous political example of  how slaves, the “second front,” 
came to undermine the slaveholders’ republic.102
Having first been seen as an element of  strength, slaves 
unquestionably became the enemy within the Confederacy, as 
they fled readily to Union lines and provided Union soldiers 
with pertinent information. Thus, in January 1864, Major-
General Cleburne proposed to emancipate slaves to “enlist 
their sympathies” in the Confederate cause, which blatantly 
acknowledged slaves’ potent impact on southern society. 
“Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by 
the actual presence or the approach of  the enemy, or even by 
a cavalry raid,” Cleburne recorded, “the whites can no longer 
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Application submited by Confederate Private Lycurgas Rees in May 1864 
for exemption from military service on the grounds of owning fifteen slaves, in 
accordance with the terms established by the “Twenty Negro Law” 
passed by the Congress of the Confederate States of America in October 1862
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with safety to their property only sympathize with our cause.”103 
Slavery forced the Confederacy “to wage war with the Union 
army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear,’” becoming “in a 
military point of  view, one of  our chief  sources of  weakness.”104
Despite the fact that both sides in the war starkly 
recognized the clandestine activities of  freed, enslaved, and 
runaway African Americans, their legacies are fleeting in 
historical memory. Cloaked in secrecy and often illiterate, African 
Americans’ covert work is rarely recorded. “Not surprisingly,” 
historian David S. Cecelski writes, “Galloway’s duties as a spy 
consigned the details of  his missions to the shadows.”105 Galloway, 
Butler, and other Union officers whom the former slave assisted 
were continually reticent about precisely where Galloway 
traveled and what he did; they put little, if  anything, into writing. 
While Galloway occasionally alluded to his service as a spy in 
postwar years, he never divulged the particulars of  his covert 
activities behind enemy lines.106 An excerpt of  a later speech to 
the Republican State Convention in Raleigh, North Carolina, in 
September 1867, demonstrated Galloway’s oblique manner of  
discussing his service as a Union spy: “I rendered good service 
to this government—if  I didn’t do it publicly, I did it privately.”107 
In particular, how Galloway survived in the Deep South after 
being captured at Vicksburg in 1862 and suddenly reappearing 
at a Union camp in New Bern, North Carolina, in mid-1863 
remains unknown. He was illiterate and never transcribed how 
he managed to escape from a Confederate stockade or prison 
camp in Mississippi and how he traversed from the heart of  
the Confederacy back to New Bern.108 A later edition of  the 
newspaper Anglo-African proved the only exception, as it alluded 
to Galloway being captured on the “distant Southern strand,” 
but provided no further information.109 Most likely, Galloway 
never fully revealed his experience as a captured Union spy in 
Mississippi.110 His life as a slave, fugitive, and spy trained him 
to take caution habitually, hardly provoking him to publicize his 
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efforts.111 
Like Galloway’s records, most military records of  African 
Americans’ covert activities are utterly incomplete.112 What remains 
are military correspondences noting the assistance of  “negroes,” 
indistinctly termed together and devoid of  any recorded identity. 
Nonetheless, each and every “negro” undoubtedly shaped the 
five-year conflict that resulted in a Union victory. 
By April 1865, the reality was evident: the attempt to 
build an independent slaveholding republic had failed. The 
southern vision crumbled in the face of  Union forces and the 
heroic resistance of  its own enslaved population. Rather than 
furthering its own ideals, the Confederate war effort cemented 
the destruction of  slavery.113 The war itself  highlighted that the 
slaves’ “war within” was boundless, that they undermined the 
Confederacy in ways unimaginable.114 The slaves proved, time 
and again, their vast abilities to assist the Union Army and Union 
Navy, so much so that by 1865, some Confederates even argued 
for the eradication of  slavery to ensure their own safety and the 
survival of  their own country. 
The war itself  produced the very conditions that enabled 
African Americans to participate in northern clandestine 
activities and become so detrimental to the southern cause—it 
was precisely because of  their exclusion from the political, and 
thereby military, arena that allowed for their casual exploitation 
of  the Confederacy. Despite the fact that southern planters and 
mistresses suspected and feared their slaves’ insurgent activities 
throughout the war, African Americans continually participated 
in covert activities throughout the five-year struggle. The war 
transformed the society it sought to preserve.
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